USA v. Torrey Thompson by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-17-2013 
USA v. Torrey Thompson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Torrey Thompson" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1370. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1370 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-3695 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TORREY THOMPSON, 
 
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-01-cr-00426-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable John R. Padova 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 8, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  January 17, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Torrey Thompson appeals from the District Court’s sentence of 60 months’ 
imprisonment following violations of Thompson’s supervised release conditions.  We 
will affirm. 
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I. 
 Because we write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual 
context and legal history of this case, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
 In June 2002, after pleading guilty to federal charges of armed bank robbery, 
conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, use of a firearm during a violent crime, and 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Thompson was sentenced to 120 months’ 
imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release.1
A few weeks later, the Probation Office filed an amended petition in which it 
alleged that a new arrest warrant had been issued that day charging Thompson with rape, 
and that Thompson had removed his electronic monitoring transmitter from his ankle and 
had left his home without permission.  Following his arrest on the amended petition, 
  In April 2011, while on 
supervised release, Thompson was arrested and charged under Pennsylvania law in 
connection with three thefts from vehicles.  Following Thompson’s arrest, the Probation 
Office filed a petition alleging that Thompson had violated the terms of his supervised 
release by committing the thefts and by failing to report his arrest to his probation officer.  
Thompson then appeared before the District Court, which granted his motion for a 
continuance, denied the government’s request for detention, and ordered Thompson 
placed on home confinement with electronic monitoring. 
                                              
1 Thompson was later resentenced to 96 months’ imprisonment followed by five 
years of supervised release. 
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Thompson appeared before the District Court and admitted the thefts and reporting 
violations.  The District Court revoked Thompson’s supervised release and sentenced him 
to 60 months’ imprisonment, with no supervised release to follow.2
Thompson’s timely appeal to this Court followed. 
 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) to determine 
whether to revoke Thompson’s supervised release.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
 We review a sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release “for 
reasonableness with regard to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States 
v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007).  “We review a district court’s legal 
conclusions regarding the [Sentencing] Guidelines de novo, its application of the 
Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion, and its factual findings for clear error.”  
United States v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2009). 
III. 
Thompson argues that the District Court’s sentence was procedurally 
unreasonable.  We disagree. 
In order for its sentence to be procedurally reasonable, a district court must give 
“meaningful consideration” to the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  United 
                                              
2 After sentencing Thompson, the District Court granted the government’s request 
to dismiss the violation based on the rape charge. 
  
4 
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).  “The court need not, however, discuss 
a defendant’s clearly nonmeritorious arguments, or otherwise ‘discuss and make findings 
as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into 
account in sentencing.’”  Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543 (quoting Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329). 
 Thompson argues that the District Court failed to give “any consideration” to the 
§ 3553(a) factors.  We have examined the record, however, and find that the District 
Court addressed the applicable factors in determining Thompson’s sentence.  The 
transcript of Thompson’s supervised release hearing shows that when it announced its 
sentence, the District Court considered, among other factors, the nature and 
circumstances of Thompson’s violations, his history and characteristics, and the need for 
the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to protect the public 
from further crimes.  We therefore conclude that the District Court’s sentence was not 
procedurally unreasonable. 
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
